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Supreme Court of the United States
No. 13-517
GREGORY P. WARGER,
Petitioner,
v.
RANDY D. SHAUERS,
Respondent.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR AMICI CURIAE PROFESSORS OF LAW
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
Amici are professors of law who have written extensively on the history of the jury, the Federal Rules
of Evidence, and the right to an impartial jury. Amici
accordingly have a scholarly interest in the historical
background and proper resolution of the question presented here.1
1

Letters consenting to the filing of this amicus brief have
been filed with the Clerk of the Court. No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no person other than amici or their counsel made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief.

2
Amici are:
•

Neil Vidmar, Russell M. Robinson II Professor
of Law, Duke Law School

•

Lisa Kern Griffin, Professor of Law, Duke Law
School
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This case requires the Court to consider the intersection of two distinct practices: (1) the American tradition of allowing litigants to inquire into the biases of
potential jurors through voir dire and giving litigants
the right to seek relief when a juror fails to disclose a
bias and is wrongly empaneled, and (2) the historical
rule barring jurors from disclosing the contents of their
deliberations in order to impeach their verdicts, which
is now codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), but
which at common law was known as the Mansfield Rule.
A review of the history and purposes of these two practices reveals that the latter was never intended to
trump or undermine the former.
Voir dire in its present American form was essentially unknown in England. While jurors in England
could be challenged for cause, litigants were allowed to
examine jurors about their biases only in limited circumstances. By contrast, America has developed a robust
commitment to voir dire, which has proven to be essential to the American jury selection process. In at least
some cases, it has been recognized as a constitutionally
required element of the right to an impartial jury.
The Mansfield Rule, by contrast, was first articulated in England before the American tradition of voir dire
had developed, by judges who accordingly could not
have contemplated that the rule would extend to shielding evidence of juror dishonesty during voir dire. The
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rule originally arose from the now discredited belief
that witnesses should not be permitted to testify to
their own turpitude. And although American courts
adopted the Mansfield Rule in narrowed form to serve
other goals, it has never been viewed as an absolute
prohibition on juror testimony. To the contrary, this
Court and others have consistently recognized that the
rule’s objectives—shielding the jury’s deliberations
from scrutiny and promoting finality of verdicts—must
yield in appropriate cases to fundamental principles of
fairness. Indeed, in the years leading up to the adoption
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, a substantial body of
caselaw held that the Mansfield Rule does not bar the
admission of jurors’ statements during deliberations to
show dishonesty during voir dire.
In light of the distinct histories and policies underlying voir dire and the Mansfield Rule, this Court
should construe Rule 606(b) not to preclude admission
of juror testimony to prove that a juror lied during voir
dire and thus should never have been empaneled in the
first place. Absent a clear contrary indication, the rules
of evidence should be presumed to have adopted the
common-law understanding of the Mansfield Rule. And
nothing in Rule 606(b)’s drafting history suggests that
Congress intended to repudiate the long-standing
recognition that testimony regarding dishonesty in voir
dire falls outside the scope of the Mansfield Rule.
Moreover, given the central role that voir dire plays in
exposing juror bias—including insidious racial bias—a
contrary interpretation would needlessly raise grave
constitutional concerns. The core constitutional right to
a fair and impartial jury militates against such a reading of Rule 606(b). Finally, the privilege accorded jury
deliberations exists only because of safeguards such as
voir dire that ensure an impartial jury; Rule 606(b)
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should not be construed to undermine the basic guarantee of a fair and unbiased jury on which it rests.
ARGUMENT
I.

VOIR DIRE IS A U NIQUELY AMERICAN INSTITUTION
THAT HAS DEVELOPED INTO AN ESSENTIAL GUARANTOR O F T HE R IGHT T O A F AIR T RIAL

Under the English common law, there was no
equivalent to the current American practice of voir
dire; the right to interrogate potential jurors was quite
circumscribed. By contrast, American law has long
recognized that litigants must have the right to question jurors, and obtain truthful answers, to ensure that
prospective jurors are free of bias and otherwise able to
fulfill their duties. Indeed, voir dire is a pillar of the
American jury system and a fundamental safeguard of
the right to a fair and impartial jury.
A. English Common Law Had No Equivalent To
The American Voir Dire Process
Voir dire in its modern American form—the examination of jurors under oath to discover potential bases
for challenge—was largely unknown in the English
common law. That is not to say that juror challenges
did not exist. Although such challenges were rarely
exercised, the common law did permit litigants to challenge jurors for cause. Where English common law differed from the modern American system, however, is in
the method by which litigants ascertained potential bases for challenge. Voir dire, the centerpiece of that
process in the United States and a crucial guarantor of
an impartial jury, did not exist in England in its modern
American form, and questioning of prospective jurors
played only a minimal role in English practice.

5
1.

Common law challenges to jurors

At common law, the jurors in the panel (or “little
pane,” an “oblong piece of parchment” containing jurors’ names)—were generally selected by the sheriff. 3
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England
353, 358-359 (Wendell ed. 1852); see also Hans & Vidmar, The Evolution of the American Jury 35 (1986).
The sheriff returned the panel to the court “many
weeks” prior to trial so that the litigants could familiarize themselves with the jurors and determine whether
to challenge any jurors for cause. 3 Blackstone, Commentaries 355.
The common law contained a complex taxonomy of
challenges for cause.2 Challenges “to the array” alleged
partiality on the part of the sheriff or other person that
arrayed the panel. 3 Blackstone, Commentaries 359.
Such a challenge was to all the persons on the panel and
could result in quashing the entire array. Id.; Coke,
Commentary Upon Littleton 156a (19th ed. 1853) (Coke
on Littleton).3 Challenges “to the polls,” by contrast,
were “exceptions to particular jurors.” 3 Blackstone,
Commentaries 359, 361.
One ground for challenge to the polls was “suspicion of bias or partiality.” 3 Blackstone, Commentaries
363; see also Coke on Littleton 156b-158b. Such chal2

Peremptory challenges were also available, at least in criminal cases. See Coke on Littleton 156b.
3

Such challenges were limited in cases against the Crown.
Coke explained that “where the king is partie, one shall not challenge the array for favour, &c. because in respect of his allegiance
[the sheriff] ought to favour the king more.” Coke on Littleton
156a; see also Hans & Vidmar, supra, at 35.
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lenges fell into two categories. “Principal” challenges
could be raised when there were “prima facie evident
marks of suspicion” that a juror might be biased, such
as the juror’s kinship with a party. 3 Blackstone,
Commentaries 363. Challenges “to the favor,” by contrast, could be raised “where the party hath no principal challenge; but objects only some probable circumstances of suspicion, as [a juror’s] acquaintance [with a
party] and the like.” Id.
2.

Ascertaining bases for challenge

“[T]he common-law rule provided for no preliminary examination [of jurors] in advance of challenge[.]”
Millar, Civil Procedure of the Trial Court in Historical
Perspective 291 (2005). Instead, litigants had to rely on
personal knowledge or independent investigation to ascertain potential grounds for challenging a juror, and
were able to question jurors only after a challenge had
been raised.4
“[B]y the policy of the ancient law, the jury was to
come de vicineto, from the neighborhood of the vill or
place where the cause of action was laid in the declaration[.]” 3 Blackstone, Commentaries 359. The rationale was that jurors from the neighborhood “were
supposed to know beforehand the character of the parties and witnesses, and therefore … better knew what
credit to give to the facts alleged in evidence.” Id. By
the same token, litigants knew, or could easily investigate, potential jurors’ reputations. Making the panel
available to the parties well in advance of trial was
4

Cf. id. (noting rare cases to the contrary but explaining that
“these instances involved departure from established rule,” a “deviation … definitely discountenanced in the later practice”).
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therefore an essential element of the jury-selection
process, ensuring that “the parties … have notice of the
jurors, and of their sufficiency or insufficiency, characters, connections, and relations, that so they may be
challenged upon just cause.” Id. at 355.
Although the geographic restrictions of the “ancient
law” loosened over time, 3 Blackstone, Commentaries
359-360, the method for challenging jurors did not:
The theory today is the same as stated by
Peake at the opening of the nineteenth century,
in his work on Evidence: “The pannell,” he
says, “is made out and known to the parties
long before the trial; they have an opportunity
of inquiring as to the characters and course of
life of the persons named in it; and if they find
anything which destroys the competency of a
juror, they may be prepared to prove it.”
Millar, supra, at 292 (quoting Peake, Law of Evidence
141 (Am. ed. 1812)).
3.

Examination of jurors

Under the English common law, examination of jurors under oath did not serve its modern American purpose of uncovering potential bases for challenge. Instead, it played a far more limited role in jury selection.
At common law, challenges alleging bias or partiality for reasons that were not grounds for a principal
challenge were decided by “triors” appointed by the
court. These triors heard evidence and decided “whether the juror be favorable or unfavorable.” 3 Blackstone,
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Commentaries 363.5 As part of this process, the juror
could in some circumstances “be examined on oath of
voir dire, veritatem dicere.” Id. at 364. Such examinations were rare, however, for three reasons.
First, as discussed above, examination of jurors
was permitted only after a challenge, and such challenges were rarely made. Millar, supra, at 292. That
continues to be the case today. “In the modern English
practice challenges continue to be possible, but very
seldom are interposed, and only in the rare event of a
challenge can there be any … examination of the juror.”
Id.; see also Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 218-220
(1965) (noting that “in England … both peremptory
challenge and challenge for cause have fallen into disuse”), overruled on other grounds by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
Second, even in the event of a challenge, examination of jurors did not always occur. Litigants had to rely
on extrinsic evidence to ascertain any causes for challenge in the first place, and could rely on the same evidence to prove the cause. Moreover, as one annotation
to Blackstone observed of English practice, “[c]hallenges
are seldom tried; the officer of the court, upon the objection being intimated to him, refrains from calling the juror.” 3 Blackstone, Commentaries 331 n.19.
Third, examination of jurors was permitted only as
to “such causes of challenge as are not to [the juror’s]
dishonor or discredit; but not with regard to any crime,
or any thing which tends to his disgrace or disad5

Once a sufficient number of jurors were seated, the jurors
themselves became the triors. Id.; see also Moore, Voir Dire Examination of Jurors: I. The English Practice, 16 Geo. L.J. 438, 443
(1927-1928) (describing procedure for deciding challenge).
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vantage.” 3 Blackstone, Commentaries 364; Coke on
Littleton 158b (“If the cause of challenge touch the dishonor or discredit of the juror, he shall not be examined
upon his oath[.]”).
The scope of this prohibition was surprisingly
broad. Notably, the prohibition extended to whether a
juror had expressed a prior opinion regarding a case.
In Cook’s case, for example, the defendant sought to
question jurors as to whether “they had … said he was
guilty, or would be hanged.” Anonymous, 91 Eng. Rep.
141 (K.B. 1691). The court ruled that “[t]his is a good
cause of challenge, but then the prisoner must prove it
by witnesses, not out of the mouth of the juryman,” as
such a statement “would charge [the juror] with misdemeanor or misbehaviour.” Id. The defendant could
not inquire, the court explained, as to that which
“would make a man discover that of himself which
tends to shame, crime, infamy, or misdemeanor.” Id.
Similarly, the defendant in King v. Edmonds, 106
Eng. Rep. 1009, 1016 (K.B. 1821), sought to challenge
jurors “on the ground of opinions supposed to have
been expressed by those gentlemen hostile to the defendants and their cause.” The defendant did not “offer
to prove such an expression, by any extrinsic evidence,
but … proposed to obtain the proof, by questions put to
the jurymen themselves.” Id. The court held that it
was proper to “refuse[] to allow such questions to be
answered,” reasoning that “it is a very dishonourable
thing for a man to express ill-will towards a person accused of a crime, in regard to the matter of his accusation.” Id. at 1017.
Accordingly, jurors were rarely questioned during
the jury selection process. Such questioning occurred
only in the unusual circumstance in which (1) a litigant
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raised a challenge to a juror after ascertaining grounds
for the challenge through personal knowledge or investigation; (2) the litigant sought to prove the grounds for
the challenge through testimony from the juror; and (3)
the cause of challenge did not tend to the juror’s “dishonor or discredit.”
B. America Developed A Robust Practice Of
Voir Dire As An Essential Guarantor Of The
Right To An Impartial Jury
Voir dire in its modern American form bears little
resemblance to the English model described above and
could hardly have been contemplated by the likes of
Coke, Blackstone, and Mansfield. In America, voir dire
has developed into a critical part of the jury-selection
process and a key guarantor of the right to an impartial
jury.
1.

Development of the American model

The precise origins of the American practice of voir
dire are unclear. But as early as the 1807 trial of Aaron
Burr, “Chief Justice Marshall had no difficulty in allowing extensive examination of jurors as to their previous
opinion of the guilt of the accused.” Millar, supra, at
292-293. Such inquiry would have been prohibited under English practice because it entailed both (1) questioning jurors before any challenge had been raised and
(2) questioning jurors about prior statements regarding
the defendant’s guilt.
Nonetheless, “it came to be accepted in most of the
American jurisdictions … that a preliminary questioning of the jurors on the voir dire, for the purpose of ascertaining whether a challenge would be in order, was a
definite right of the parties.” Millar, supra, at 292.
American practice also diverged in other significant
ways from the British example. American voir dire al-
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lows “a much wider field of inquiry than was permitted
at common law.” Id. “The voir dire in American trials
tends to be extensive and probing, … and the process of
selecting a jury protracted.” Swain, 380 U.S. at 218220. The prohibition on examining jurors as to causes
that tend to their “dishonor and discredit” likewise fell
by the wayside. See Millar, supra, at 292.
2.

Practical motivations

The dramatic expansion of voir dire in American
practice was rooted in part in the necessities of jury
trials in a large and heterogeneous country. The English practice developed in a society in which jurors were
likely to come from the same neighborhood as the litigants. Litigants could therefore rely on personal
knowledge of potential jurors or their reputations as a
basis for making challenges.
In modern times, however, litigants in U.S. courts
are unlikely to have any personal knowledge of potential jurors or any practical ability to conduct meaningful
investigation of jurors’ backgrounds independent of
voir dire. In Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497, 503
(1948), for example, it appears that jurors were selected
from a pool of over five hundred. It is hardly feasible—
at least for litigants of average means—to conduct any
meaningful investigation of such a large number of potential jurors. Moreover, courts have recognized that
even if such inquiries were possible, they would be less
desirable than the more transparent voir dire process.
See Kiernan v. Van Schaik, 347 F.2d 775, 778-780 (3d
Cir. 1965) (“The impartiality of jurors should be tested
under the control of the court rather than by the unsupervised activity of investigators with all the undesirable possibilities of intimidation and jury tampering
which such surveillance inevitably presents.”).
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3.

Voir dire protects the right to an impartial jury and a fair trial

Even more significant than these practical considerations, however, has been the recognition that meaningful voir dire is essential to protecting the constitutional right to a fair trial.
“One touchstone of a fair trial is an impartial trier of
fact—‘a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely
on the evidence before it.’” Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S.
209, 217 (1982). Indeed, the Sixth Amendment expressly
protects criminal defendants’ right to a trial “by an impartial jury.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. And although the
Seventh Amendment, which guarantees the right to trial
by jury for civil litigants in federal court, does not include similar language, this Court has recognized that
“[t]he American tradition of trial by jury, considered in
connection with either criminal or civil proceedings,
necessarily contemplates an impartial jury drawn from a
cross-section of the community.” Thiel v. Southern Pac.
Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946) (emphasis added); see also
Kiernan, 347 F.2d at 778 (“Amendment VII preserves
‘the right of trial by jury’ in civil cases, and although the
impartiality of the jury is not expressly mentioned it is
inherent in the right of trial by jury[.]”); cf. McDonough
Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 549
(1984) (relying on “right to an impartial jury”).
“The right to an impartial jury is” also “guaranteed
… by principles of due process.” Turner v. Murray,
476 U.S. 28, 53 (1986); see also In re Murchison, 349
U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (“A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a
basic requirement of due process.” (emphasis added));
Kiernan, 347 F.2d at 778 (impartial jury right is implicit in the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause).
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“Voir dire examination serves to protect [the impartial jury] right by exposing possible biases, both
known and unknown, on the part of potential jurors.”
McDonough, 464 U.S. at 554; see also Tanner v. United
States, 483 U.S. 107, 127 (1987) (describing voir dire as
a “source[] of protection of petitioners’ right to a competent jury”).6 “Without an adequate voir dire the trial
judge’s responsibility to remove prospective jurors who
will not be able impartially to follow the court’s instructions and evaluate the evidence cannot be fulfilled.”
Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188
(1981); see also id. at 188 (“Voir dire plays a critical
function in assuring the criminal defendant that his
Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury will be
honored.”); Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving ‘Its Wonderful Power,’ 27 Stan. L. Rev. 545, 549 (1975)
(“[W]ithout a reasonable amount of information about
the prospective jurors, the litigant cannot realize his
right to ‘select’ the jury by challenges for cause and by
peremptory strikes.”).
Voir dire is particularly essential as a mechanism
for revealing racial, religious, and like forms of prejudice. As this Court long ago recognized, voir dire is critical in ferreting out those especially insidious forms of
prejudice: “[T]he juror best knows the condition of his
6

See also United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 133-134 (1936)
(finding juror qualification statute did not violate Sixth Amendment right to impartial jury because “[a]ll persons otherwise qualified for jury service are subject to examination as to actual bias”
and “[a]ll the resources of appropriate judicial inquiry remain available … to ascertain whether a prospective juror, although not exempted from service, has any bias in fact which would prevent his
serving as an impartial juror”); Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S.
162, 171-172 (1950) (“Preservation of the opportunity to prove actual bias is a guarantee of a defendant’s right to an impartial jury.”).
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own mind” as to such biases, and thus “no satisfactory
conclusion” about the juror’s impartiality “can be arrived at, without resort to [the juror] himself.” Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 313 n.3 (1931)
(quoting People v. Reyes, 5 Cal. 347, 349 (1855)).7 Racial
prejudice, for example, is “a fact … of the most vital import to the defendant.” Id. at 313 n.1. But that prejudice, “if existent, [is] locked up entirely within the
breasts of the jurors,” and can be determined “only …
by interrogating the juror himself.” Id. (quoting Pinder
v. State, 8 So. 837, 838 (Fla. 1891)). Where voir dire
shows that a juror “entertain[s] a prejudice which would
preclude his rendering a fair verdict, a gross injustice
would be perpetrated in allowing him to sit.” Id. at 314.
This Court has accordingly held that the Constitution itself imposes “requirements with respect to questioning prospective jurors about racial or ethnic bias.”
Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 189-190. Specifically, a defendant has a constitutional right to “inquire into possible racial prejudice” when there are “substantial indications of the likelihood of racial or ethnic prejudice affecting the jurors in a particular case.” Id. at 190.8
7

See also Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304, 309-311 (1880)
(“It is evident from the examination of the jurors on their voire
dire, that they believed that polygamy was ordained of God, and
that the practice of polygamy was obedience to the will of God.…
It needs no argument to show that a jury composed of men entertaining such a belief could not have been free from bias or prejudice on the trial for bigamy, of a person who entertained the same
belief, and whose offence consisted in the act of living in polygamy.”).
8

This Court has required additional protections in various
circumstances. “[A] capital defendant accused of an interracial
crime is entitled to have prospective jurors informed of the race of
the victim and questioned on the issue of racial bias.” Turner v.
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Moreover, this Court has recognized that the importance of such inquiries outweighs any concern—
which in part animated the English common-law restrictions on voir dire—about examining jurors in ways
that could bring them into disrepute. As the Court explained in Aldridge:
The argument is advanced on behalf of the government that it would be detrimental to the
administration of the law in the courts of the
United States to allow questions to jurors as to
racial or religious prejudices. We think that it
would be far more injurious to permit it to be
thought that persons entertaining a disqualifying prejudice were allowed to serve as jurors
and that inquiries designed to elicit the fact of
disqualification were barred. No surer way
could be devised to bring the processes of justice into disrepute.
283 U.S. at 314-315.
Voir dire’s role as the guarantor of an impartial jury is not confined to instances of racial bias or prejudice. In capital cases, for example, defendants are entitled to voir dire to identify “those biased persons on the
venire who as jurors would unwaveringly impose death
after a finding of guilt.” Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S.
Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36-37 (1986). This Court also requires, as
part of its “supervisory authority over the federal courts,” that
“questions directed to the discovery of racial prejudice be asked in
certain circumstances in which such an inquiry is not constitutionally mandated.” Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 190. For example,
“federal trial courts must make such an inquiry when requested by
a defendant accused of a violent crime and where the defendant
and the victim are members of different racial or ethnic groups.”
Id. at 192.

16
719, 733 (1992). “Were voir dire not available to lay
bare the foundation of petitioner’s challenge for cause”
in such circumstances, the defendant’s right to an impartial jury “would be rendered … nugatory and meaningless.” Id. at 733-734.
In sum, voir dire of a sort that would have been
barred under the English common-law rule is now essential to the American jury selection process. Under
the common-law rule, a litigant would have had to determine whether to challenge jurors for prejudice
based entirely on extrinsic evidence, without the benefit of voir dire. And even after such a threshold challenge was made, voir dire could have been barred under
the rule prohibiting inquiries that tend to the juror’s
“dishonor or discredit.” In the modern American system, by contrast, voir dire regarding juror bias or prejudice is a matter of constitutional right in appropriate
cases, see Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 189-190—a dramatic departure from the English common law.
II. THE MANSFIELD R ULE WAS NOT DESIGNED TO SHIELD
DISHONESTY DURING VOIR DIRE THAT WOULD U NDERMINE A L ITIGANT’ S R IGHT T O A N I MPARTIAL J URY
While voir dire in its present form is an American
innovation, the common-law predecessor to Rule
606(b)—the Mansfield Rule—was imported from England and originated before the American practice of voir
dire had taken its current form. As originally formulated, the Mansfield Rule thus did not contemplate the
unique problems posed by juror dishonesty during voir
dire, or the constitutional implications of precluding inquiry into such dishonesty. In any event, the Mansfield
Rule has never been understood, either as it was first
articulated in England or as it was later applied in the
United States, as an absolute bar to the admission of
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evidence regarding the content of jury deliberations.
To the contrary, in the period leading up to the adoption
of Rule 606(b), numerous American courts recognized
that juror testimony establishing dishonesty in voir dire
falls outside the ambit of the Mansfield Rule.
A. The Development Of The Mansfield Rule In
England
The common-law restriction on testimony regarding
the content of jury deliberations dates from 1785, when
the Mansfield Rule was first announced. Before then,
“the unquestioned practice had been to receive jurors’
testimony … without scruple … [and] proof of [misconduct] was received equally from jurors and others without discrimination.” 8A Wigmore, Treatise on the
Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at
Common Law § 2352 n.2 (3d ed. 1961) (collecting a dozen pre-1785 cases in which juror affidavits were accepted); see also McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264 (1915)
(“Prior to 1785 a juror’s testimony was sometimes received, though always with great caution.”).
The Mansfield Rule is generally traced to Lord
Mansfield’s seminal decision in Vaise v. Delaval, 99
Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B. 1785). In that case, two jurors
submitted affidavits stating that the jury had decided
the case by “tossing up,” i.e., by tossing a coin. Lord
Mansfield rejected the testimony, concluding that jurors could not testify to their own misconduct. The
Mansfield Rule was soon widely adopted in England,
and it is still followed throughout the British Commonwealth. See Hunter, Jury Deliberations and the Secrecy Rule: The Tail That Wags The Dog?, 35 Sydney L.
Rev. 809, 814-816 (2013).
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As Lord Mansfield originally formulated it, the rule
against considering juror testimony that the jury had
decided the case through improper means was not related to protecting the integrity of jury verdicts or the
secrecy of the jury. Instead, it was rooted in the principle that such testimony by a juror was unreliable because any witness who testifies to his own turpitude is
inherently untrustworthy.9 Indeed, Lord Mansfield
suggested that a jury verdict could be challenged based
on the content of the jurors’ deliberations if the witness
testifying that the case was decided by a coin toss was a
passerby who saw the coin toss through a window, rather than a juror. Vaise, 99 Eng. Rep. at 944 (“The
Court cannot receive such an affidavit from any of the
jurymen themselves, in all of whom such conduct is a
high misdemeanor[,] but in every such case the Court
must derive their knowledge from some other source[,]
such as from some person having seen the transaction
through a window or by some such other means.” (footnote omitted)); see also 27 Wright & Gold, Federal
Practice & Procedure § 6074 (2d ed. 2007) (“Lord Mansfield’s rule applied only to statements offered by the
juror directly to the court; testimony from court officers or eavesdroppers as to what jurors said during deliberations was not excluded.”). Thus, the Mansfield
Rule as originally articulated was in no way designed to
privilege the secrecy of jury deliberations over the
basic guarantee of an impartial jury, but only to exclude
a type of evidence that was then thought to be particularly unreliable.
9

Lord Mansfield advocated the position that witnesses cannot
testify to their own turpitude in many other unrelated contexts,
but in all other contexts it was ultimately “utterly repudiated, in
both England and America.” Wigmore, supra, § 2352.
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Moreover, the Mansfield Rule was, of course, announced well before the American institution of voir
dire had developed. Neither Lord Mansfield nor the
many Commonwealth courts that followed his rule
could have envisioned either voir dire in its modern
American form or the importance of voir dire to fair
trials in the modern American justice system. It is thus
unsurprising that amici are aware of no English cases
from this period applying (or declining to apply) the
Mansfield Rule in evaluating the admissibility of testimony regarding a juror’s false statements during voir
dire. Nor does it appear that the major treatises of the
time ever considered whether the Mansfield Rule
would appropriately apply in such a scenario.
B. The Mansfield Rule In America
1.

Initial adoption and limitations

In the first half of the nineteenth century, apparently on the strength of the prestige of Lord Mansfield,
the rule barring jurors from testifying to their deliberations was widely adopted in America. See Wigmore,
supra, § 2352 (attributing adoption of the Mansfield
Rule to the “prestige of the Great Chief Justice” and
stating that “its authority came to receive in the United
States an adherence almost unquestioned”).
Over the course of the second half of the nineteenth
century and into the twentieth century, however, while
there was significant variation among jurisdictions,
American courts increasingly recognized that the
Mansfield Rule was not absolute and would yield to
fundamental principles of fairness. In United States v.
Reid, 53 U.S. 361 (1851), for example, this Court confronted the Mansfield Rule for the first time. In that
case, the defendant sought to introduce jurors’ affida-
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vits stating that they had seen newspaper articles discussing the case. The Reid Court ultimately sidestepped the question of the Mansfield Rule’s application
on the ground that the articles appeared not to have
influenced the jury’s verdict. But, while noting that jurors’ testimony about their deliberations “ought always
to be received with great caution,” the Court noted that
“cases might arise in which it would be impossible to
refuse [to admit such testimony] without violating the
plainest principles of justice.” Id. at 366.
The Iowa Supreme Court recognized such a limitation on the Mansfield Rule in the 1866 case of Wright v.
I&M Telegraph, 20 Iowa 195. The court held that juror
testimony regarding aspects of jury deliberations that
“essentially inhere” in the verdict—such as jurors’ misunderstanding of evidence or use of questionable reasoning in reaching a verdict—could not be admitted as
a basis for obtaining a new trial. Id. at 209-210. By
contrast, testimony regarding aspects of deliberations
that did not inhere in the verdict—such as the jury’s
use of an improper process, e.g., a coin toss, to arrive at
a verdict—could be admitted. Id. at 210. Wright accordingly permitted the admission of juror testimony
that the case had been decided by a “quotient” verdict
(i.e., by averaging the award of damages preferred by
each juror).
The Iowa court rejected the logic of Vaise, observing that “if, as is universally conceded, it is the fact of
improper practice, which avoids the verdict, there is no
reason why a court should close its ears to the evidence
of it from one class of persons [i.e., the jurors], while it
will hear it from another class [i.e., eavesdroppers],
which stands in no more enviable light and is certainly
no more entitled to credit.” Wright, 20 Iowa at 212.
And the court emphasized the importance of fairness to
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the litigants, concluding that “there can be no sound
public policy which should prevent a court from hearing
the best evidence of which the matter is susceptible, in
order to administer justice to the party whose rights
have been prejudiced” by the jury misconduct. Id.
Other courts followed the Iowa rule or identified
other exceptions to or limitations on the Mansfield
Rule. By 1881, there were “several cases” that “held
that the affidavits of jurors may be received” in some
circumstances in support of a motion for a new trial.
Rogers, Impeachment of Verdicts for Misconduct
(1881).10
This Court later addressed the Mansfield Rule in a
trio of cases, each of which reiterated the basic principle that the Mansfield Rule was not absolute, but could
be trumped by considerations of fairness. In Mattox v.
United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892), the Court considered juror testimony that during deliberations in a
murder trial, the jury had read a highly prejudicial
newspaper article and had been told by the bailiff that
the victim was the third person the defendant had
killed. The Court concluded that a new trial was required, emphasizing that “public policy, which forbids
the reception of the … statements of jurors to impeach
their verdicts, may, in the interest of justice, create an
exception to its own rule.” Id. at 148.
In Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347 (1912), the
Court considered allegations that the jurors had
reached a compromise verdict, trading acquittal of two
defendants for conviction of two others. The Court cit10

Faculty Scholarship Series, Paper 4049, http://digital
commons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/4049 (collecting cases).
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ed Wright with approval, adopting the “inhere in the
verdict” terminology announced in in that case. However, it applied that framework somewhat differently
than the Iowa Supreme Court, concluding that the allegations of compromise, even if true, would merely establish facts that essentially inhere in the verdict, and
thus could not form a basis for challenge. Id. at 383-384.
Finally, in McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264 (1915),
the Court considered the same question presented in
Wright—whether juror evidence of a quotient verdict
should be admitted—and held that it should not. Id. at
267-268. The Court did not, however, disturb its holding in Hyde that the Mansfield Rule applies only to juror testimony regarding matters that inhere in the verdict. And the Court reiterated Reid’s admonition that
the Mansfield Rule should not be applied inflexibly in a
manner that infringed on basic principles of justice. Id.
at 268-269.
2.

The intersection between the Mansfield
Rule and voir dire

In the first half of the twentieth century, courts
began to grapple with the intersection between voir
dire and the Mansfield Rule. When confronted with a
conflict between the two, courts in many jurisdictions
concluded that ensuring honesty in voir dire should
trump the Mansfield Rule. As one commentator explained:
Cases from several jurisdictions have taken the
position that affidavits or testimony of jurors,
even though disclosing matters occurring in the
jury room, may be received in support of a motion or petition for a new trial, where offered,
and operating, to show the existence of bias or
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prejudice of a juror, or a fact grounding a challenge of the juror for cause, concealed on his
voir dire examination notwithstanding welldirected questions were put to him touching
such matters.
Allen, Admissibility, In Civil Case, Of Juror’s Affidavit Or Testimony To Show Bias, Prejudice Or Disqualification Of A Juror Not Disclosed On Voir Dire Examination, 48 A.L.R.2d 971 § 2 (1956).
Although the law on this question was by no means
uniform, a substantial body of caselaw emerged from a
wide variety of jurisdictions recognizing that the Mansfield Rule did not apply to cases in which evidence regarding a jury’s deliberations was offered to establish
that a juror had failed to disclose bias during voir dire.
As one court articulated the rule, “Affidavits of jurors
may be received as to … the deliberations of the jury
which tend to prove the existence of prejudice in the
mind of a juror, which would prevent his acting as an
impartial juror, where the state of mind is charged to
have been entertained and to have been intentionally
concealed during his voir dire examination.” In re
Mesner’s Estate, 176 P.2d 70, 76 (Cal. Ct. App. 1947); see
also Department of Public Works & Buildings v. Christensen, 184 N.E. 2d. 884, 887 (Ill. 1962) (“Although [the
Mansfield] doctrine is generally recognized, it is subject
to an exception when it is charged that a juror has answered falsely on voir dire about a matter of potential
bias or prejudice.”); State by Lord v. Hayden Miller Co.,
116 N.W.2d 535, 539 (Minn. 1962) (“The privilege which
protects the deliberations of the jury from exposure
does not extend to statements of jurors who may have
on voir dire concealed prejudice or bias which would
have disqualified them[.]”); McNally v. Walkowski, 462
P.2d 1016, 1019 (Nev. 1969) (“[T]he jurors’ affidavits
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were admissible for the limited purpose of showing concealment of actual bias by several of the jurors on their
voir dire examination.”); Allison v. Department of Labor & Indus., 401 P.2d 982, 984 (Wash. 1965); Russ, Recent Case, Evidence—Affidavit Concerning Jurors’
Unauthorized View Inadmissible As Ground For New
Trial, 15 Buff. L. Rev. 217, 220 & n.29 (1965) (collecting
New York cases showing that “[j]urors’ affidavits have
also been accepted, in support of a motion for new trial,
to disclose a juror’s concealed prejudice on voir dire, on
the ground that due to his partiality he was never eligible to become a member of the jury”).11
To be sure, some cases held that juror affidavits disclosing the jury’s deliberations could not be admitted
even to show dishonesty during voir dire. See, e.g., Wilson v. Wiggins, 94 P.2d 870, 871-872 (Ariz. 1939); Hinkel
v. Oregon Chair Co., 156 P. 438, 439 (Or. 1916); see also
Allen, supra, § 2 (collecting cases). However, even many
of the courts that were generally unwilling to accept
such evidence recognized that concealed bias during voir
dire threatens the fundamental right to a fair trial and
requires special treatment. Thus, while Missouri, Arizona, and Kentucky courts refused to accept juror affidavits disclosing the contents of deliberations to show that
11

See also United States ex rel. Owen v. McMann, 435 F.2d
813, 819-821 (2d Cir. 1970) (considering juror testimony that disclosed content of deliberations where testimony established juror
bias); Orenberg v. Thecker, 143 F.2d 375, 376-377 (D.C. Cir. 1944)
(apparently assuming that evidence from jurors showing fraudulent juror statements during voir dire could be considered on motion for new trial, but finding no such evidence); Alabama Fuel &
Iron Co. v. Powaski, 166 So. 782, 786-788 (Ala. 1936) (allowing admission of juror affidavits to establish misconduct on voir dire, but
only if a prima facie case of misconduct was first established using
evidence external to the jury).
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other jurors had been dishonest in voir dire, all of them
held that a juror’s testimony regarding that juror’s own
concealed bias was admissible in support of a motion for
a new trial. See Woodworth v. Kansas City Pub. Serv.
Co., 274 S.W.2d 264, 270-271 (Mo. 1955); Board of Trustees of Eloy Elem. Sch. Dist. v. McEwen, 430 P.2d 727,
731-734 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967); Drury v. Franke, 57
S.W.2d 969, 984 (Ky. Ct. App. 1933).12
The position that the Mansfield Rule does not preclude evidence of a juror’s dishonesty during voir dire
was substantially buttressed by this Court’s decision in
Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1933). There, the
Court held that testimony regarding the content of deliberations is admissible in a subsequent proceeding
against a juror for contempt resulting from dishonesty
during voir dire, and that the general rule privileging
the secrecy of jury deliberations had no application in
such a case. The Court explained that “[i]f [a juror’s]
answers to the [voir dire] questions are willfully evasive or knowingly untrue, the talesman, when accepted,
is a juror in name only. His relation to the court and to
the parties is tainted in its origin; it is a mere pretense
and sham.” Id. at 11. That is, a juror who lied during
12

These cases specifically recognized the importance of voir
dire to ensuring an impartial trial. See Kansas City Pub. Serv.
Co., 274 S.W.2d at 270-271 (“It is the duty of a venireman on voir
dire examination to fully, fairly and truthfully answer all questions, so that challenges may be intelligently exercised, and the
venireman’s intentional concealment of a material fact may require
the granting of a new trial.”); Drury, 57 S.W.2d at 984 (noting that
a litigant may be “entitled to a new trial because a juror gave a
false answer, or no answer, to a pertinent question addressed to
him on the voir dire examination” and that “the right [to] challenge
[a juror] includes the incidental right that the information elicited
on the voir dire examination shall be true”).
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voir dire should never have been seated on the jury in
the first place. Admitting evidence regarding the juror’s misstatements thus did not improperly intrude
into the jury’s deliberations, but preserved the core
guarantee of an impartial jury.
Although Clark arose in the context of contempt
proceedings, its logic was clearly applicable to cases in
which a litigant sought a new trial based on a juror’s
dishonesty during voir dire. Indeed, Clark itself noted
that the rule that “the testimony of a juror is not admissible for the impeachment of his verdict” is “not
without exception,” and cited Hyman v. Eames, 41 F.
676 (D. Colo. 1890)—a case in which juror testimony
regarding the content of deliberations was admitted to
show that a juror had concealed bias during voir dire—
as an example. Clark, 289 U.S. at 18. In Hyman, the
court held that when “considering the competency of [a
challenged juror] to sit as a juror … the testimony of
his associates may be received.” 41 F. at 677-678.
After Clark, several courts drew the obvious parallel and concluded that if juror testimony was admissible
for purposes of punishing a dishonest juror, it should
logically be admissible to remedy the consequences of
the juror’s dishonesty in a proceeding to determine
whether a litigant should receive a new trial. See Pet.
Br. 29 (collecting cases). The 1961 edition of Wigmore’s
treatise likewise endorsed the proposition that juror
testimony should be admissible to establish dishonesty
during voir dire. As Wigmore explained, “the privilege
[against introduction of juror testimony] ceases where
the inquiry concerns a crime committed by the juror
prior to the jury’s retirement, e.g., perjury in answering
questions on the voir dire.” Wigmore, supra, § 2354
(emphasis in original). Overall, the weight of authority
was such that a commentator in 1958 concluded: “If a
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juror’s remarks during deliberations indicate that he
has given false answers or has concealed relevant information on the voir dire, it is settled that the verdict
may be impeached”—that is, that testimony regarding
the jury’s deliberations could be admitted in support of
a motion for a new trial. Comment, Impeachment of
Jury Verdicts, 25 U. Chi. L. Rev. 360, 367-368 n.53
(1958) (emphasis added).
III. RULE 606(b) SHOULD NOT BE INTERPRETED TO EXCLUDE J UROR T ESTIMONY R EGARDING D ISHONESTY
DURING VOIR DIRE
The history of, and policies underlying, the Mansfield Rule and the American practice of voir dire
strongly support the conclusion that Rule 606(b) does
not bar admission of juror testimony regarding the content of deliberations to show dishonesty during voir
dire. As discussed above, the English common-law regime that created the Mansfield Rule did not accord
voir dire the same central place as a guarantor of core
constitutional rights that it occupies in this country;
American courts have always recognized that fundamental principles of fairness trump the Mansfield Rule;
and the rule was widely understood not to bar juror
testimony showing dishonesty during voir dire. There
is no indication whatever that the drafters of Rule
606(b) intended to depart from these principles, and
Rule 606(b) should be construed to harmonize with, rather than to repudiate, long-settled common law.
Moreover, construing Rule 606(b) to bar admission
of testimony relating to juror dishonesty during voir
dire would trench upon the basic right to an impartial
jury. Such a construction would thus raise grave constitutional concerns. It would also be at war with the
premises on which Rule 606(b) is predicated. For these
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reasons, too, the court of appeals’ reading of Rule
606(b) should be rejected.
A. The History Of The Mansfield Rule Is Inconsistent With The Construction Of Rule 606(b)
Adopted By The Court Of Appeals
As this Court recognized in Tanner v. United
States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987), “Federal Rule of Evidence
606(b) is grounded in the common-law rule against admission of jury testimony to impeach a verdict and the
exception for juror testimony relating to extraneous influences.” Id. at 121. “The normal rule of statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legislation to
change the interpretation of a judicially created concept,
it makes that intent specific.” Midlantic Nat’l Bank v.
New Jersey Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 501
(1986). Therefore, unless the drafters clearly indicated
a contrary intent, Rule 606(b) should be read to codify
the Mansfield Rule as it was applied and understood at
the time the Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted—
that is, as not barring introduction of a juror’s testimony
regarding statements made during deliberations that
show juror dishonesty during voir dire.
As petitioner ably demonstrates, neither the text
nor the legislative history of Rule 606(b) reveals any
such contrary intent. By its terms, the rule addresses
only an “inquiry into the validity of a verdict,” not an
inquiry into the composition of the jury. Fed. R. Evid.
606(b) (emphasis added). As this Court recognized in
Clark, a juror who lies during voir dire “is a juror in
name only.” 289 U.S. at 11. Accordingly, a challenge to
the seating of that juror is not an inquiry into the validity of the jury’s verdict. Indeed, Rule 606(b)’s legislative
and drafting history reflect no consideration of juror
dishonesty during voir dire. Nor is there any indication
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that Congress intended to reject the substantial body of
caselaw holding that juror testimony establishing that a
juror was dishonest during voir dire does not fall within
the scope of the Mansfield Rule. See Pet. Br. 30-35.
Rule 606(b) should accordingly be interpreted to permit
admission of evidence of juror dishonesty during voir
dire.
B. Rule 606(b) Should Not Be Construed In A
Way That Would Threaten The Constitutional
Right To An Impartial Jury
Moreover, interpreting Rule 606(b) to preclude juror testimony regarding dishonesty during voir dire
would conflict with the fundamental constitutional right
to an impartial jury. Rule 606(b) need not, and should
not, be so interpreted. Under the constitutional avoidance canon, “[a] statute must be construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional but also grave doubts upon that score.”
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 237
(1998). The canon “rest[s] on the reasonable presumption that Congress did not intend” an interpretation
“which raises serious constitutional doubts.” Clark v.
Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381 (2005).
As discussed in Part I.B.3, supra, voir dire is a key
safeguard of the right to an impartial jury—explicitly
guaranteed in the Sixth Amendment and inherent in
the Seventh Amendment and Due Process Clause—
because it enables the litigants and the court to screen
out biased jurors (including racially or religiously prejudiced jurors). When jurors intentionally conceal partiality or prejudice, the right to a fair trial that has always been understood as providing a limit on the Mansfield Rule is threatened. See McDonough Power
Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 554 (1984)
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(“The necessity of truthful answers by prospective jurors if [voir dire] is to serve its purpose is obvious.”).
Numerous commentators have recognized the potential constitutional concerns that would arise if defendants were denied a remedy for verdicts that are
the product of biased jurors who would not have been
empaneled had they responded honestly during voir
dire. See, e.g., Miller, Dismissed with Prejudice: Why
Application of the Anti-Jury Impeachment Rule to Allegations of Racial, Religious, or Other Bias Violates
the Right to Present a Defense, 61 Baylor L. Rev. 872,
880-881 (2009); Federal Practice & Procedure § 6074
(noting that “there is a serious problem in using Rule
606(b) to exclude all testimony of jury bias. Democratic
institutions like the jury can produce oppression when
the majority uses its values to demean the rights of minorities.”); Crump, Jury Misconduct, Jury Interviews,
and the Federal Rules of Evidence: Is the Broad Exclusionary Principle of Rule 606(b) Justified?, 66 N.C.
L. Rev. 509, 524 (1988) (“A disturbing context involving
the issue of jury misconduct … occurs when a juror
manifests racial bias during deliberations.”).
In many cases, statements made during jury deliberations will be the only evidence of dishonesty during
voir dire. As a result, prohibiting testimony about the
content of deliberations will often leave litigants with
no remedy for a trial by a jury that did not satisfy constitutional standards for impartiality. See Perkins v.
LeCureux, 58 F.3d 214 (6th Cir. 1995) (Jones, J., concurring) (“The rule of juror incompetency cannot be applied in such a manner as to deny due process.”); cf.
Clark, 289 U.S. at 12-14 (juror privilege against testifying about deliberations does not apply where the juror
was seated on false pretenses because maintaining the
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privilege in those circumstances “is paying too high a
price for the assurance to a juror of serenity of mind”).
Of course, not every question asked during voir dire
would uncover prejudice of the kind that amounts to a
denial of the constitutional right to an impartial jury.
But as this Court has observed, the constitutional
avoidance canon is a tool for “choosing between competing plausible interpretations of a statutory text,” not a
“method of adjudicating constitutional questions by other means.” Clark, 543 U.S. at 381. Thus, “[i]t is not at
all unusual to” impose “a limiting construction called for
by one of the statute’s applications, even though other
of the statute’s applications, standing alone, would not
support the same limitation.” Id. at 380. As this Court
has recognized, there is a significant set of cases in
which barring a litigant from demonstrating that a juror
lied during voir dire would amount to denial of the core
right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. See supra Part
I.B.3. Rule 606(b) should not be construed to permit
that result.
C. Precluding Evidence Of Dishonesty In Voir
Dire Would Undermine Rule 606(b)’s Premise
Finally, construing Rule 606(b) to preclude juror
testimony about dishonesty in voir dire would undermine a basic premise of that rule.
It is only the existence of a robust voir dire process—the key safeguard of an impartial jury—that justifies deferring to the jury’s verdict and generally barring inquiry into the jury’s deliberative process. As
this Court made clear in Tanner, “the protection of jury
deliberations from intrusive inquiry” rests on the assumption that “[t]he suitability of an individual for the
responsibility of jury service … is examined during voir
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dire.” 483 U.S. at 127; see also, e.g., United States v.
Duzac, 622 F.2d 911, 913 (5th Cir. 1980) (upholding the
rule against admitting testimony that jurors’ “personal
prejudices were not put aside during deliberations” on
the ground that “[t]he proper time to discover such
prejudices is when the jury is being selected and peremptory challenges are available to attorneys.”).
Voir dire’s “protection of [the] right to a competent
jury,” Tanner, 483 U.S. at 127, is a predicate on which
Rule 606(b) is premised and the rule can only be
properly understood in that light. Rule 606(b) should
not be construed in a manner that weakens the efficacy
of the voir dire safeguard by denying litigants a remedy
for dishonesty during voir dire, and thereby undercuts
the rule’s foundation.
CONCLUSION
The Eighth Circuit’s judgment should be reversed
and the case remanded for further proceedings.
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